Why the Two-State Solution Isn’t Working

The Arab-Israeli peace process has hit another dead end—as usual, due to bickering over settlements. After a fruitless ten-month settlement freeze, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reopened construction this last September to appease Israeli settlers. Since then, negotiations with the US have opened the door for a second freeze, but settlers have been pressuring fundamentalist parties in Netanyahu’s coalition to prevent it.

The Arab-Israeli peace process has hit another dead end—as usual, due to bickering over settlements. After a fruitless ten-month settlement freeze, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reopened construction this last September to appease Israeli settlers. Since then, negotiations with the US have opened the door for a second freeze, but settlers have been pressuring fundamentalist parties in Netanyahu’s coalition to prevent it.

Strong opposition like this leads Americans to believe that Arab-Israeli conflict is insoluble, but the truth is more complex. Certain issues, such as deciding who controls Jerusalem and whether or not Palestinian refugees should return to their homeland, really are divisive. However, most Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state solution, and many Israelis are willing to concede some settlements for peace. If this is really the case, then how do minority fundamentalist parties prevent concessions that most Israelis support? The answer lies in Israel’s electoral system. This system, combined with increasing political factionalization over the last decade, allows fundamentalist parties to kill the two-state solution.

Israel’s electoral system, a proportional representation (PR) system, is problematic because its low electoral threshold allows radical parties to emerge. America’s electoral system tends to produce two parties that converge ideologically in the center; PR systems, on the other hand, tend to produce multiple parties that diverge ideologically, allowing smaller, more radical groups to gain a political voice. Governments concerned with this tendency often establish electoral thresholds—most ranging from 3% to 10%—that make it difficult for these groups to gain power. Although Israel should arguably be concerned with radical parties, Israel’s electoral system has an unusually low threshold. Originally at 1%, its threshold has risen to 2% since 2003. This is a step in the right direction, but it’s still too small to prevent the emergence of fundamentalist parties.

These parties wouldn’t prevent peace if they never ended up on a majority coalition. However, they often do because of competition between the mainstream parties, Likud, Kadima, and Labor. Getting these parties to cooperate is like trying to get Democrats and Republicans to cooperate on healthcare reform. Although they will ally out of necessity, the winning party would rather form a coalition with an outlier than with the “enemy.” For instance, after the 2009 parliamentary elections, Netanyahu’s Likud tried to form a coalition with Kadima. However, its leader Tzipi Livni refused to join with fundamentalist groups in Netanyahu’s coalition, stating that Netanyahu either “goes with the Right or with us.” So Netanyahu chose the Right, even though together Likud and Kadima would have been just five seats short of a parliamentary majority. In the end, the result is a coalition government that contains fundamentalist groups and does not reflect Israeli majority opinion.

Changes in public opinion over the last decade have amplified these problems. Although most Israelis agree on several important issues—for instance, the two-state solution—data from recent Israeli parliamentary elections shows that they are becoming politically factionalized. Before 1996, most voters cast their ballots for just one or two major parties, and the largest party in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, always controlled 40–56 seats. Because the Knesset has 120 seats, this means that the largest party always controlled 33%–46% by itself. But since 1996, the largest parties have each controlled only 26–38 seats, or 22%–32%. Given that Israel’s electoral system guarantees polarization, these recent changes in public opinion don’t bode well for the viability of future peace attempts.
Since Israel’s electoral system is contributing to the growth of the settler movement and the failure of peace processes, changes should be instituted quickly so that fundamentalist minorities don’t frustrate majority-supported peace efforts. If not, the Arab-Israeli conflict could soon become truly insoluble.

David is a Sophomore studying Middle Eastern Studies and Arabic. Basseem is a Graduate Student working toward a PhD in Chemical Engineering.
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